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Abstract 
This paper proposes a new modeling method that transforms an infrastructure system with interdependent and correlated 
facility failures into an equivalent one with an explicit supporting structure. This structure consists of a set of supporting 
stations that are subject to only independent disruptions with identified probabilities, and thus is much easier to characterize 
and formulate. Such a supporting structure framework is capable of not only providing a mathematical representation of 
complex facility failure mechanisms but also physically emulating interdependent infrastructures and their inter-connections 
in many real-world systems. We examine the properties of this structure and find that it can be used to model a range of 
heterogeneous and correlated facility failure patterns. A mathematical model built on the supporting structure is created to 
solve reliable facility location design problems under correlated facility failure risks. This model determines the optimal 
locations for supporting stations and service facilities to minimize the total system cost including infrastructure investment in 
the early planning stage and the expected transportation costs and service-loss penalties during the operational stage. This 
model is formulated into a compact integer linear program and can be efficiently solved by state-of-the-art solvers. A set of 
experiments and case studies are conducted to demonstrate the applicability of the proposed model and to draw managerial 
insights into the optimal system design. 
© 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. Selection and peer-review under responsibility of Delft University of 
Technology. 
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1. Introduction 
    Infrastructures, such as those for transportation, energy, communications, are critical to the welfare and 
sustainability of a modern economy. Complex connections from increasing physical, resource, information, and 
social interactions have tied these critical infrastructures into highly coupled and interdependent network 
systems. Such interdependent infrastructures, however, are particularly vulnerable to natural and human-induced 
disasters, as evidenced by the series of recent catastrophic events and their associated costs for response and 
recovery. Well-known examples include the 2002 west-coast port lockout that strangled U.S. freight supply 
chains (D'Amico, 2002) [1], the massive power outage in 2003 that disabled major transportation systems in the 
Northeast (Schewe, 2004) [2], and the 2005 Hurricane Katrina that idled all production and transportation 
facilities in the Gulf Coast region (Godoy, 2007) [3]. Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi nuclear reactor failure in March 
2011, in particular, was not due to direct impact of the 8.9-magnitude earthquake or the tsunami that followed, 
but rather due to the loss of regular electricity power supply (from outside power stations) for its emergency 
cooling system (World Health Organization, 2011) [4]. This highlights the pressing need to address the potential 
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risk of correlated (or even cascading) failures while planning and designing interdependent infrastructure 
networks. 
    Network location design has been intensively studied for several decades. Most early efforts focused on 
systems with deterministic settings, and numerous models have been developed using discrete (see Daskin 
(1995) [5] and Drezner (1995) [6] for reviews) and continuous (see Langevin et al. (1996) [7] and Daganzo 
(2005) [8] for reviews) formulations. Later, researchers started to investigate facility congestion that arises from 
stochastic demand and attempted to enhance system availability by providing redundancy (Daskin, 1982 [9], 
1983 [10]; Revelle and Hogan, 1989 [11]; Batta et al., 1989 [12]; Ball and Lin, 1993 [13]). Recently, adversary 
impacts from stochastic facility failures have been recognized, and reliable facility location models were 
proposed to design facility locations and customer assignment plans under probabilistic facility failure risks 
(Snyder and Daskin, 2005 [14]; Cui et al., 2010 [15]; Qi et al.,2010 [16]; Chen et al., 2011 [17]; Li and Ouyang, 
2011 [18], 2012 [19]). These efforts have produced a number of mathematical models to design infrastructure 
systems where operations at different facilities are isolated and facility failures are completely independent. 
However, to our best knowledge, only a very few studies ever considered correlated failure mechanisms. Li and 
Ouyang (2010) [20] addressed correlations among network facility failures in the context of reliable facility 
location design, but the developed continuum approximation model is only suitable for macroscopic problems 
with a smooth and continuous setting. Berman and Krass (2011) [21] studied a reliable p-median problem 
considering correlated disruptions, but the analysis is only limited to problems in a one-dimensional space. In the 
infrastructure protection context, Liberatore et al. (2012) [22] considered facility failure propagations by a two-
dimensional correlation matrix, which however only captures deterministic capacity losses under pair-wise 
failure correlations rather than stochastic failures or their higher-order correlations. Few discrete models have 
been developed in the form of a compact mathematical program (i.e., the numbers of variables and constraints 
are polynomial functions of the problem size) for a highly heterogeneous two-dimensional space with stochastic 
correlated facility failures. Even evaluating the expected performance of a given design is quite challenging, 
which is probably because no efficient modeling method was found to describe correlated facility failures (e.g., 
without enumerating the large number of probabilistic failure scenarios). 
    This paper explores the methodological feasibility of formulating interdependent facility failures in a compact 
form so as to efficiently solve the reliable facility location design problem under failure correlations. We propose 
an explicit supporting structure framework to equivalently represent a range of correlated facility failure patterns, 
e.g., those due to shared fallible resource suppliers or common disastrous hazards. This framework transforms 
convoluted and complex failure correlation patterns observed at service facilities into a set of explicitly 
connected supporting stations that are subject to only independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) disruptions. 
With proper settings (e.g., connection relationships and station disruption probabilities), such a supporting 
structure can be used to emulate a general class of correlated facility failure patterns. Besides, it is actually 
consistent with many real-world infrastructure interdependence relationships (e.g., electricity grids experiencing 
power plant disruptions, and bridge networks exposed to earthquakes), and thus it can be directly used to model 
a range of realistic infrastructure system design problems. 
    Building upon the proposed supporting structure model, we further propose a mathematical programming 
model that determines the optimal network location design for an infrastructure system under correlated facility 
failure risks. The optimal design shall minimize the total expected system cost throughout the planning horizon, 
including both the initial infrastructure investment to construct supporting stations and service facilities and the 
expected day-to-day operational costs due to customer traveling or loss of service. This problem is formulated 
into a compact integer linear program and can be solved efficiently by state-of-the-art commercial solvers. 
Numerical experiments and case studies are conducted to illustrate the applicability of the proposed model 
framework and to show interesting insights on how various system parameters (e.g., correlation pattern, failure 
probability, spatial heterogeneity) impact the optimal network design. 
    The exposition of the remainder of this paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces the notation of a supporting 
structure and associated cost components. Key properties of the supporting structure are identified. Building 
upon this structure, Section 3 proposes a reliable facility location design model that has a compact formulation 
and can be efficiently solved with state-of-the-art solvers. Section 4 conducts numerical and case studies and 
analyzes their results. Section 5 concludes this paper and discusses possible future research. 
 
2. Supporting Structure Analysis 
 
    The core system of our interest includes a set of spatially distributed customers and a set of facilities that 
provide certain service to the nearby customers. We assume these facilities may fail (and thus stop providing the 
service) from time to time, and we allow their failures to be site-dependent and spatially-correlated. Such a 
model can represent many real-world systems where infrastructures are subject to disruptions due to various 
internal or external hazards. However, efficiently and accurately quantifying the performance of such a system is 
quite challenging, primarily due to the difficulty in modeling complex facility failures in an efficient and 
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compact form (e.g., without enumerating all possible combinatorial failure scenarios). Nevertheless, many 
complex failure patterns in a real-world system are caused by certain underlying mechanisms shared by 
individual facilities (e.g., a common disaster, shared resource suppliers). Thus, instead of directly enumerating 
all failure scenarios, we propose to represent failure mechanisms of the service facilities equivalently by 
attaching a properly-defined supporting station structure. Basically, the supporting structure includes a set of 
vulnerable supporting stations, each of which is connected to certain service facilities. We require that a facility 
is operational if at least one of its connected supporting stations is functioning. This way, this paper shows that 
facility failures with general site-dependent and positively-correlated patterns can be equivalently “transferred” 
to independent and homogeneous disruptions in the supporting structure. 
    In the remainder of this section, Section 0 introduces the notation of a supporting structure representation of 
an infrastructure system and the related cost components. Section 0 discusses several key properties of this 
structure and shows how to use it to represent a range of heterogeneous and correlated facility failure patterns. 
 
2.1 System framework 
 
    We consider a system consisting of a set of supporting stations, a set of service facilities, and a group of 
distributed customers to be served by the service facilities. In this section we focus our analysis on the case 
where the supporting stations and the service facilities have already been built at sets of locations *K  and J*, 
respectively. We assume that installing a supporting station at a location *k K  and opening a facility at *j J  
incurred fixed installation investments that are equivalent to annual costs kc
a and jf , respectively. This yields a total (annually-prorated) system infrastructure investment cost as follows, 
 
 
* *
j k
j J k K
f c
 
¦ ¦ . (1) 
 
    Operating each service facility requires it to be connected to at least one supporting station. We assume that 
each supporting station k is connected to (or supports) a subset of facilities * *kJ J . For notation convenience, 
we also define * *: { | }j kK k j J  , i.e., the subset of stations supporting facility j. In this system, customers reside 
at a set of discrete locations, I , and the number of customers at each location i I  is iO . These customers will 
visit nearby facilities for service, and the annual transportation cost for customer i  to visit facility *j J  is ijd . 
In the normal scenario when every installed station is functioning (and therefore every built facility is 
operational), customer i obviously visits the facility with the minimum transportation cost ijd  (i.e., the closest 
facility). However, because the supporting stations are subject to disruption hazards, they may be disrupted from 
time to time. When this happens, a facility with all its supporting stations disrupted will not be able to provide 
any service, and all its customers will have to either travel a longer distance to an operational facility, or give up 
the service and bear a certain penalty. We assume that the annual loss (or penalty cost) for customer i to give up 
the service is iS . Apparently, customer i will not visit any facility j with ij id S! . To systematically analyze the 
station disruptions, we assume that operations of stations and facilities follow the following rules: 
R1: Each station is disrupted independently with an identical disruption probability p;  
R2: Only those service facilities connected to at least one functioning station can serve customers; and 
R3: When a facility is no longer supported by any functioning station, it will fail to provide any service, 
and each of its customers will try to find a next closest functioning facility for serviceb, until no such 
facility is available or the corresponding travel cost exceeds the penalty from losing service. 
    We define a combination of realized binary functioning states of all installed supporting stations as a 
disruption scenario. It is easy to see that due to Rule R1, the number of possible disruption scenarios is huge, i.e., 
exponential to the number of installed stations. In different scenarios, a customer may not always visit the same 
facility and the associated operational cost may vary dramatically. Hence a deterministic cost formulation (e.g., 
only considering the normal scenario; see Daskin 1995 [5]) is no longer suitable for quantifying the overall 
performance of this system. Instead, we follow the recent studies on stochastic reliable facility network design 
(Snyder and Daskin, 2005 [14]; Cui et al. 2010 [15]; Chen et al. 2011 [17]) and use the expected operational 
costs (including transportation costs and out-of-service penalties) to quantify the operational performance. In 
these existing studies, facility failures are independent, and thus the operational cost can be formulated by 
assigning facility locations to each customer at different priorities. However, in our case, due to the likely 
                                                                
a When stations are created merely as a virtual representation of facility correlations but do not actually exist, we can just set all ck to 0. 
b We assume that every customer is rational and has complete information about the facility failure status and thus is always able to identify 
its nearest functioning facility (if any) in any realized failure scenario.    
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correlations among service facility failures, it is no longer intuitive to formulate such facility-to-customer 
assignments in a compact form. Hence, we propose a new method that uses the ranks of supporting stations to 
quantify the expected system operational cost, as described in the following.  
    For formulation convenience, we assume that each customer is assigned to up to R supporting stations, where 
constant R  is pre-determined based on resource and communication constraints. In each disruption scenario, a 
customer at i will visit the closest facility supported by at least one functioning station among its R assigned 
facilities, if such a facility exists and its transportation cost is less than penalty iS ; otherwise, this customer 
gives up service and bears penalty iS . Note that to exactly satisfy operational rule R3, we just need to set R = 
|K*|. Nevertheless, for a practical problem, using an R  value smaller than |K*| (but significantly greater than 1) 
does not affect the system design significantly, since the service probability of a rank R station to a customer 
attenuates at a rate exponential to R (Li and Ouyang 2010 [20]). 
    Although a station *k K  may support multiple facilities *kJ , only the facility with the lowest transportation 
cost ijd  can possibly serve the customers at i when station k is functioning (it is obviously suboptimal 
otherwise). For each customer location i , we define virtual distance * * *: min { , , },ik i ij kd d j J k KS      (note 
that *ik id S  if *kJ   ). Then the per capita cost when station k supports the service to the customers at i can 
always be captured by *ikd . If 
*K Rt , we select R stations in *K  with the smallest *ikd  values and rank them 
into      ,1 , ,2 , ,k i k i k i R  such that      * * *,1 ,2 ,ik i ik i ik i Rd d dd d d  (ties can be broken arbitrarily). Otherwise, 
we define a virtual penalty station indexed by 0, and set  *, 1k i K     *, 2 , 0k i K k i R     , and 
*
0 :i id S . This way, we can always obtain R ranked distances  ^ `* , 1,2, ,ik i r r Rd   for customer location i. It is not 
difficult to see that to minimize the operational cost, these R stations should be assigned to customers at i with 
priorities equal to their ranks. This yields the expected operational cost associated with a customer at i as  
 
  
1 *
,1
(1 )R r Riik i rr p p d pS  ¦ . 
 
And thus the total expected operational cost for all customers is 
 
  
1 *
,1
(1 )R r Ri i iik i ri I r i Ip p d pO OS   ¦ ¦ ¦ . (2) 
 
    To illustrate this framework, Figure 1 provides an example where I = {i} with iO  = 1, J* = {A, B, C} and K* = 
{a, b, c, d}. Distances between the customer and the facilities are ^ `, ,iA iB iCd d d ^ `10, 20, 30 , and connections 
between the facilities and the stations are * { , }AK a b , * { , }BK b c , * { }CK d , which is equivalent to * { }aJ A , 
* { , }bJ A B , * { }cJ B , * { }dJ C . Suppose R = 3 and iS  = 25. Then * {10}iad  , * {10}ibd  , * {20}icd  , and 
* {25}idd  , and thus ( ,1)k i a , ( ,2)k i b , ( ,3)k i c . Suppose station disruption probability p = 0.2. Then this 
supporting structure equivalently represents a failure pattern mere service facilities (without considering the 
attached structure) in which (i) facilities A, B, and C have individual failure probabilities 0.04, 0.04 and 0.2, 
respectively, and (ii) failures at A and B are correlated such that the failure probability of one conditioning on 
the other’s failure is 0.2. This illustrates how i.i.d. disruption probabilities of supporting stations together with 
explicit connections between the stations and the facilities can represent site-dependent and correlated facility 
failures. The total expected operational cost from Equation (2) will be 10.44, including a transportation cost of 
10.24 and a penalty cost of 0.2.  
 
Fig. 1. Illustration of the supporting structure framework 
b c
i
a d
A B C
10 20 30
Supporting Stations
Service Facilities
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2.2 Structure properties 
 
    Obviously, the supporting structure model proposed in Section 2.1 can be directly used to model a real-world 
infrastructure system that has explicit supporting relationships and i.i.d. disruptions at the supporting stations. 
However, the main purpose of developing such a model framework is to describe much more complex systems. 
With proper settings, such an artificial supporting structure can equivalently represent systems with 
heterogeneous and correlated facility failure patterns. This section will discuss a set of properties of the proposed 
supporting structure that serve as the basis for such a representation. 
    We first discuss in Proposition 1 and Proposition 2 how this model can be used to formulate reliable facility 
network design problems under independent yet heterogeneous facility failures with site-dependent probabilities ^ ` *0 1j j Jq d d  (Cui et al, 2010 [15]). 
 
Proposition 1. Under rules R1–R3, the unconditional probability for a facility at *j J  to fail is *jKp . 
Proof. From the assumptions, the probability for the facility at j  to fail is the probability for all installed stations 
connected to facility j to be disrupted independently, which is obviously 
*
jKp .□ 
 
Proposition 2. Any set of site-dependent facility failure probabilities ^ ` *0 1j j Jq d d  under independent facility 
failures can be approximately represented by a finite number of supporting stations that are properly connected 
to *J  within an arbitrarily small approximation error 0H ! . 
Proof. We can construct such a supporting system in the following way. For each facility j, we add a set of Nj 
stations with i.i.d. disruption probability p and connect them only to facility j. This way, the unconditional failure 
probability for each facility j is simply jNp . Since * * *' , 'j jK K j j J   z  , it is obvious that the facility 
failures are independent to each other. Then the proposition can be equivalently stated as that given 
^ ` *0 1j j Jq d d , there exists a solution to variables [0,1]p  and *{1,2, },jN j J    in the following 
problem: 
 
 *, ,j jN Njq p p j JH Hª º    ¬ ¼ .  (3) 
 
If jq is either 0 or 1
*, j J  (meaning every facility is either absolutely reliable or always failed), a trivial 
solution to (3) is 1p H  , 1jN   for all j  with 0jq  , and 1logjN H H ª º« »  for all j  with 1jq  . 
Otherwise, there exists a facility with a failure probability in (0,1), and we say the index of this facility is 0 
without loss of generality. For any 0N , we can always find a feasible p such that 00 (0,1)
Nq p  . Then we can 
rewrite problem (3) only in terms of station numbers ^ `jN , as follows 
 
 ^ `0 0/ / *0 0, , \ 0j jN N N Njq q q j JH Hª º    ¬ ¼ . (4) 
 
If 0jq  , for any feasible 0N  value, we can set 00 logj qN N Hª º « »  to suffice (4). Otherwise, 0logq jq  is always 
a finite non-negative number and thus can be approximated by a positive rational number with an arbitrary 
accuracy. Hence we can always find a positive rational number jn  such that 0 0,j j
n n
jq q qH Hª º  ¬ ¼ . Due to 
properties of rational number, each jn  can be written as a factional number with both integral denominator and 
numerator. We can convert these fraction numbers into those with a common integer denominator, and then we 
can obtain a set integer values ^ ` *j j JN   such that 0/j jN N n . Also, p  should be set to 01/0 Nq . This solves 
problem (3) and completes the proof. □ 
 
    The following propositions further discuss how to use the proposed model to represent facility failure 
correlations. Li and Ouyang (2010) [20] used conditional probabilities to characterize failure correlations. The 
supporting structure in the proposed model can also be used to construct conditional facility failure probabilities. 
We define the failure state of each facility j as a binary random variable Sj, i.e., Sj = 0 if facility j is functioning, 
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or Sj = 1 if it has failed. The conditional probabilities of facility failures are specified in the following 
proposition, which obviously holds by the definition of conditional failure probabilities.  
 
Proposition 3. For any two subsets *', ''J J J , the probability that all facilities in 'J  fail conditional on that 
all facilities in ''J  have failed, i.e., Pr 1, ' 1, ''j jS j J S j Jª º     ¬ ¼ , equals 
\ 0J JK Kp cc c t , where 
*:J j J jK Kc c  and *'' '':J j J jK K . 
 
    Note that with a proper selection of p value and ^ `*jK , the probability \J JK Kp cc c  can take any value between 0 
and 1, Even though each station has a uniform disruption probability p, the supporting structure allows us to 
freely set \J JK Kcc c  to any integer value for each unique subset \J JK Kcc c  regardless of this value for any other 
subset. Hence, from the proof for Proposition 2, we can see that ^ ` *\ \J J J JK K K K Kp cc c cc c   can jointly approximate any 
vector of positive conditional failure probabilities at an arbitrary accuracy. Thus the proposed supporting 
structure can flexibly represent a wide range of failure correlations. 
    Some recent studies (e.g., Lim et al. 2012 [23]) used a covariance matrix of states {Sj} to characterize failure 
correlations. The correlation covariance matrix corresponding to a supporting structure is quantified in the 
following proposition, where again we can see that a range of covariance values can be flexibly approximated by 
properly selecting parameter p and ^ `*jK . 
 
Proposition 4. The covariance between binary random variables Sj and Sj', for any two built facilities at 
*, 'j j J  is * * * *' ' [0,1 4]j j j jK K K Kp p   . 
Proof. From Proposition 1, we obtain 
* *
'
' 'E( )E( ) Pr[ 1]Pr[ 1]
j jK K
j j j jS S S S p
    . And 'E( )j jS S equals the 
probability that all supporting stations connected to j and j' are disrupted, i.e., 
* *
'j jK Kp . Since 
* * * *
' 'j j j jK K K K t  and 0 1pd d , it is obvious 
* * * *
' 'j j j jK K K Kp p d  (and the inequality is strict when 
* *
'j jK K z  and 0 1p  ). Hence 'Cov( , )j jS S   ' 'E( ) - E( )E( )j j j jS S S S
* * * *
' ' 0j j j jK K K Kp p   t . It is easy 
to see that this covariance value also satisfies  * * * * * * * *' ' ' ' 2 1/ 4j j j j j j j jK K K K K K K Kp p p p d  d .□ 
 
3. Reliable Location Design Model under Correlated Failures 
 
    Built on the supporting structure model, this section proposes a compact linear integer programming model of 
reliable location design for a system with a supporting structure.a This model determines the optimal 
infrastructure locations among available candidate locations so as to minimize the total system cost comprised of 
planning investment (1) and expected operational cost (2). We adapt the notation defined in Section 0 as follows. 
Now supporting station installation locations K* and service station location J* will be selected among the sets of 
candidate locations K and J, respectively. We extend the definitions of annual infrastructure investment costs kc  
and jf  to all candidate locations in K and J, respectively. We use Jk to denote the candidate facility locations 
supported by the supporting station at k (if it is built), and Kj to be the candidate station locations supporting 
facility location j. We redefine ijd  as transportation distance from each customer i I  to each facility candidate 
location j J , and * : min { , , },ik i ij kd d j J k KS     . Again, any built station is assumed to be disrupted 
independently with an identical probability p. Then we define primary decision variables : { }j j JX  X  and 
: { }k k KY  Y  to determine the installation locations for service facilities and supporting stations, respectively, as 
follows, 
 
 ^ *1, if ;0, other e, wisj j JX   and ^ *1, if ;0, other e. wiskY k K  (5) 
 
                                                                
a Recall that such a supporting structure framework can be used to represent general facility systems with correlated and heterogeneous 
failures. 
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Then the infrastructure investment (1) can be represented in terms of these decision variables as follows,  
 
 j j k k
j J k K
f X c Y
 
¦ ¦ . (6) 
     
The summation of cost components (6) and (2) yields the total expected system cost throughout the planning 
horizon. Since term Ri ii I pOS¦ in (2) is always constant regardless of location design, we can drop it in the 
following formulations without affecting the optimal decision. Then the optimization objective is to find the 
optimal location design ,X Y  to minimize the expected system cost, as follows, 
 
  
1 *
,1{0,1} , {0,1}
min ( , ) : (1 )J K
R r
j j k k i ik i ri I r
j J k K
C f X c Y p p dO         ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦X Y X Y . (7) 
 
The above compact formulation provides a clear and concise presentation of the supporting system location 
design problem, and with this compact form, we can see that it is relatively simple to evaluate objective 
( , )C X Y  for any given ,X Y  values. However, since distances  ^ `* ,ik i rd  are actually highly nonlinear functions 
of ,X Y , it is very hard to directly solve model (7) in its current form. To devise an efficient solution approach, 
we will convert (7) into an integer linear programming problem that can be relatively efficiently solved with 
state-of-the-art solvers. 
    We introduce a set of auxiliary decision variables 
0, , ,1 ,1
: { } { }
jijkr i I j J k K r R ij r i I r R
Z Z   d d  d d Z  to decide how the 
service is passed down from supporting stations to service facilities and then to customers; i.e., 
 ^1, if customer is served by facility  supported by station at rank ;0, otherwise,ijkr i j k rZ    
^0 1, if customer is forced to give up the service at rank ;0, otherwise.i r i rZ   
 
The objective now is to determine where to build supporting stations and service facilities and how to assign 
them to each customer in order to minimize the expected total system cost across all possible disruption 
scenarios. Then model (7) can be equivalently formulated as followsa  
 
 1 0
1, ,
(min 1 )
k
R
r
j j k k ij ijkr i i r
j J k K i I r k K J
i
j
f X c Y p p d Z ZO S
     
§ ·   ¨ ¸¨ ¸© ¹¦ ¦ ¦¦ ¦¦X Y Z   (8a) 
    subject to 
 0 1, , 1,2, ,
k
ijkr i r
k K j J
Z Z i I r R
 
     ¦¦ ; (8b) 
 , , , , 1,2, ,ijkr j jZ X i I j J k K r Rd      ; (8c) 
 
1
, ,
k
R
ijkr k
j J r
Z Y i I k K
  
d   ¦¦ ; (8d) 
 0, {0,1}, , , , 1,2, , ;ijkr i r jZ Z i I j J k K r R       (8e) 
 , , {0,1}, , .j kX Y j J k K     (8f) 
 
Objective (8a) is the expected total cost including the fixed infrastructure investment and the expected total 
transportation and penalty cost. Constraints (8b) assure that at each rank, a customer either visits a facility 
supported by a functioning station or gives up the service. Constraints (8c) and (8d) check the existence of a 
facility or station before it is assigned, and constraints (8d) make sure that each station can be assigned to a 
customer at no more than one rank. Constraints (8e) and (8f) are integrality constraints. The equivalence between 
models (7) and (8) is proven in the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 5. Models (7) and (8) have identical optimal objective values. A set of ,X Y  values is optimal to (7) 
if and only if it is optimal to (8). 
                                                                
a Again, as mention in footnote 2, when stations are created as a mere virtual representation of facility correlations, this model can be 
simplified by setting ck to 0 and enforcing Yk = 1 for all k. 
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Proof. Since Models (7) and (8) have the same feasible region for variable ,X Y , we only need to prove that for 
any feasible solution ,X Y , the value of the expected operational cost  
1 *
,1
(1 )R ri ik i ri I r p p dO   ¦ ¦ from Model 
(7) is always identical to that in (8), i.e., 1 0
1
min (1 )
k
R
r
ij ijkr i i r
i I r k K j
i
J
p p d Z ZO S
   
§ · ¨ ¸¨ ¸© ¹¦¦ ¦¦Z , where Z  is subject to 
constraints (8b)-(8e). For a customer at i, at each assignment rank r, constraints (8c) and (8d) assure that station k 
can be assigned to this customer via facility j only if both the station and facility are built. Constraints (8b) 
require at each rank, this customer much either visit to an actual station or take the penalty cost. We can interpret 
the penalty as either this customer is assigned to a station but choose to give up the service due to excessive 
transportation cost or there is no station available for assignment. Then the operational cost in objective (8a) is 
consistent with the assignment strategy that R stations are always assigned to this customer if *K Rt , or all 
stations are assigned to it otherwise. Assume station k is assigned to this customer at rank r, and facility j has the 
lowest transportation cost among all built facilities supported by k. To minimize the operational cost, if facility j 
exists and has ij id S , ijkrZ  will be set to one; otherwise, 0i rZ  will be set to one as it is more economic for this 
customer to take the penalty. Either way, this contributes *ikd  to the total operational cost. Constraints (8d) also 
require that each station k can only be assigned to a customer at most once at each rank. Then to minimize the 
total operational cost, facilities shall be assigned to a customer location with their assignment ranks increasing 
with the corresponding transportation costs. As such,  ,k i r  must be assigned to customer location i at rank r. If 
there exists a rank *| |r K!  at which no more station is available for assignment, 0i rZ  will be set to 1 and it will 
still contribute *ikd  to the operational cost. This proves  
1 *
,1
(1 )R ri ik i ri I r p p dO   ¦ ¦  
1
0
1
min (1 )
k
R
r
ij ijkr i i r
i I r k K j
i
J
p p d Z ZO S
   
§ ·  ¨ ¸¨ ¸© ¹¦¦ ¦¦Z . □ 
 
    Although Model (8) describes a system involving only independent disruptions, as discussed in Section 0, it 
can be used to represent a range of reliable facility location models with more complex failure patterns. For 
example, Proposition 2 shows that the models proposed by Cui et al. (2010) [15] for site-dependent failures can 
be reformulated into Model (8), and Proposition 3 indicates that this model can also address the location 
problems with conditional-probability-based failure correlations described in Li and Ouyang (2010) [20]. Some 
of the above problems have been found extremely difficult to deal with in the literature.  
    Besides such a unifying modeling capacity, with its simple formulation structure, this proposed framework 
also possesses appealing computational tractability. The linear integer programming structure of Model (8) 
allows us to feed the problem into existing state-of-the-art integer programming commercial solvers (e.g., 
Gurobi, CPLEX). Although this problem is NP-hard (it is easy to see that the uncapacitated facility location 
problem is a special case of Model (8) when we set 0kc p  ), from our computational experiments, problem 
instances of practical sizes can be solved by a commercial solver to an exact or near-optimum solution in a 
reasonable time. While it is interesting to develop more efficient customized algorithms, using these off-the-shelf 
tools well serve the purpose of this paper (e.g., proof of concepts and analysis of system properties). Hence, we 
will leave customized algorithm development efforts to future studies. 
 
4. Examples 
 
    We will first test the proposed model on a hypothetical supporting system in Section 0. This system has a 
relatively simple setting and helps reveal insights into how supporting structures (or correlation mechanisms) 
affect the optimal system design and cost. In Section 0, we will apply the model to a more realistic case study 
consisting of major U.S. cities and nuclear power plants. This case study demonstrates how the model can be 
applied to relevant real-world facility design problems. All problem instances are solved by a commercial integer 
programming solver, Gurobi (http://www.gurobi.com/), on a PC with 3.4GHz CPU and 8GB RAM. 
 
4.1 Numerical experiments 
 
    We consider a system with N candidate supporting station locations, K = {k1, …, kN}, and N-2 candidate 
service facility locations, J = {j2, …,  jN–1}, as shown in Fig. 2. All locations in J lie on the same line, and each 
two neighboring locations are 50 miles apart. Each location in J also contains 10 customers; i.e. I = J and 
10iO  , i I  . The transportation cost for a customer to visit a location in J is proportional to the travel 
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distance with a rate of $1/mile. Set ic c , if f , iS S , where a range of N, R, p , c , f , S  values will be 
tested in the following experiments. 
  
Fig. 2. Numerical example setting 
 
    We will first study the effect of failure correlation versus independent failures, and the results are shown in 
Tables 1.1 and 1.2. In these experiments, we set N = 11 (since a relatively small N helps illustrate the effect of 
correlation), R = N = 11 (to make sure the assignement rules R1-3 are always satisfied), S  = 2000, and f = 600. 
We use CS, CF, CT, CP, and C to denote respectively the station investment cost, the facility investment cost, 
the expected transportation cost, the expected penalty cost (including the fixed portion Ri ii I pOS¦ ), and the 
total system cost (the summation of the previous four components) of the optimal solution. To focus on the effect 
of facility correlation, we view this supporting structure as a mere representation of the underlying failure 
correlation mechanism and set 0c  , and thus CS will always equal 0. Table 1.1 shows a set of optimal results 
for p[0, 0.3, 0.6, 0.9] (some p values here may be unrealistic but they can help reveal trends and asymptotic 
effects), under the original supporting structure specified in Fig. 2. We see that in Table 1.1, as p increases, 
which denotes a higher failure risk and a stronger level of correlation, the total number of facilities somehow 
increases, probably to provide better backup service. However, note that the increasing rate of the number of 
facilities is much less than that of p, and no facilities are built at neighoring candidate locations. This is because 
the facilities close to each other are more likely to fail together under such a correlation pattern, and as such, 
their functions as backups for each other will be compromized. When we ignore the failure correlations, the 
supporting structure should have each facility candidate location jl connected to only one supporting location kl, 
2, ,10l  , while decreasing p values to [0, 0.027, 0.216, 0.729], respectively. The optimal solutions for this 
new supporting system are summarized in Table 1.2. By comparing these two tables, we see that when failure 
correlation is ignored, costs CT, CP and C will be underestimated and excessive service facilities will be built. 
Such trends become more prominent as p increases. Again, this confirms our earlier discussion that under the 
specified correlation pattern (i.e., multiple facilities are more likely to fail simultaneously), the built facilities 
cannot provide sufficient backup service to justify a higher facility investment. 
 
Table 1.1. Summary of the optimal solution under the specified supporting structure 
 
p Facility locations CF CT CP C 
0 j3 j6 j9 1800 3000 0 4800 
0.3 j3 j6 j9 1800 3264 4 5068 
0.6 j2 j4 j6 j8 j10 3000 3722 653 7375 
0.9 j2 j4 j6 j8 j10 3000 6849 56485 66335 
 
Table 1.2. Summary of the optimal solution when correlation is ignored 
 
p Facility locations CF CT CP C 
0 j3 j6 j9 1800 3000 0 4800 
0.027 j3 j5 j8 j9 2400 2656 0.01 5055 
0.216 j2 j3 j5 j6 j8 j10 3600 2586 18 6204 
0.729 j2 j3 j4 j5 j6 j7 j8 j9 j10 5400 6680 10467 22547 
 
j2 j3 j4 jN-1
k1 k2 k3 k4 kN-1 kN
50 mi
…
10 customers
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    Table 2 shows the solution performance results on a range of instances of different sizes with a solution time 
limit of 5400 seconds, where the parameter values are set as the table title shows. We see that when N is 
relatively small, the commercial solver can solve the problem to the exact optimum within a short solution time. 
For instances up to a few hundred service facilities, it can solve the problem to a near-optimum solution within a 
small optimality gap (no more than 7%), which shall suffice most engineering needs. This verifies the practical 
applicability of the proposed model in solving network infrastructure planning under correlated failure risks. The 
following discussion in this section will focus on result analyses. For simplicity, we set N = 20 for the remaining 
experiments in this section. 
 
Table 2. Algorithm comparison ( 0.2p  , 1000c  , 1500f  , 500S  , 3R  ) 
 
N Upper Bound Lower Bound Optimality Gap Solution Time (sec) 
10 11404 11404 0% 1 
20 24876 24876 0% 5 
40 51968 51968 0% 633 
100 133768 126532 5% 5402 
150 202492 188820 7% 5401 
200 271188 251288 7% 5403 
250 340380 316368 7% 5400 
300 409968 379336 7% 5400 
 
    Table 3 shows how the optimal results vary with the allowed assignment level R. As we see, with R initially 
increases from 1, penalty cost CP dramatically decreases despite slight increases in infrastructure investments CS 
and CF, and as a result the total cost C significantly drops. This explains the benefit of using back-up services 
when facilities are subject to probabilistic failures. However, when R exceeds 3, its value only has a marginal 
effect on the system cost and the facility location design. In all following experiments, therefore, we set R=3 and 
focus on the effects of the other parameters. 
 
Table 3. Affects of the R value ( 0.2p  , 1000c  , 1500f  , 500S  ) 
 
R Station locations Facility locations CS CF CT CP C 
1 k5 k10 k16 j4 j6 j10 j15 j17 3000 7500 7200 18000 35700 
2 k5 k7 k14 k16 j4 j6 j8 j13 j15 j17 4000 9000 9440 3600 26040 
3 k4 k5 k8 k10 k16 k17 j4 j9 j11 j15 j17 6000 7500 10656 720 24876 
4 k3 k4 k10 k12 k17 k18 j4 j9 j11 j13 j17 6000 7500 10982 144 24626.4 
5 k4 k5 k9 k10 k16 k17 j4 j9 j11 j15 j17 6000 7500 10992 124.8 24616.8 
6 k4 k5 k11 k12 k16 k18 j4 j6 j10 j12 j17 6000 7500 10998 117.1 24615.3 
7 k4 k5 k9 k10 k16 k17 j4 j9 j11 j15 j17 6000 7500 10998 117.1 24615.3 
 
    Fig. 3 shows how values of several parameters affect the costs in the optimal design. We set 0.2p  , 
1000c  , 1500f  , 500S   as the benchmark values and test the effects of changing one of them at a time. 
Fig. 3(a) shows how station disruption probability affects the cost components. As p increases, we see that 
supporting station investment CS increases while that for service facilities generally reduces. This indicates that 
at a higher disruption risk, more stations shall be installed to and each built facility shall be supported by more 
stations to maintain its service reliability. We see that penalty cost CP is insignificant when p is small, but it 
increases rapidly and becomes a dominating component when p is relatively high. Transportation cost CT 
slightly increases with p when p is low and becomes relative steady as p grows up. This steady trend is probably 
because that the increased transportation cost due to sparser facilities is partially cancelled out by the decrease of 
served demand under unreliable service. Despite oscillations in certain cost components (e.g., CS and CF), we 
can see a relatively smooth increase of the total cost. This implies that at optimality these cost components can 
balance each other. Fig. 3(b) shows how the numbers of stations and facilities vary with p. Due to the 
homogeneous and constant construction costs, their variation trends are exactly the same as those of CS and CF 
in Fig. 3(a). 
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    Fig. 3(c) and Fig. 3(d) show how the value of station cost c affects the cost components and the numbers of 
built infrastructures. We see that the total station investment CS has an increasing trend as c grows, but the 
number of total stations consistently decreases, and the decreasing trend is particularly sharp when c is relatively 
small. Total facility investment CF initially drops and then grows up, and corresponding transportation cost CT 
has a roughly opposite trend. This suggests that as c marginally increases, the service facilities shall be pruned 
due to a sharp loss of support when c is relatively small, while more investment shall be diverted to service 
facilities when support station installations become very expensive. Penalty cost CP is relatively insensitive to 
changes of c. Total system cost C again is smoothly increasing. Note that the increasing rate of C is much lower 
than that of c. This suggests in the optimal design, the growth of one cost component rate can be partially 
absorbed by corresponding adjustments in other components. 
    Fig. 3(e) and Fig. 3(f) show the effects from increasing f. Again, CP does not change much. Facility 
investment CF grows in general, but the number of facilities drops. Due to the reduction of facilities, 
transportation cost increases along the way. Station investment CS and penalty cost CP are insensitive to the 
changes of the f value. The total cost grows but the growth rate gradually flattens down, which again indicates 
the "absorption" effect. 
    Fig. 3(g) and Fig. 3(h) show that as penalty rate S  grows up to around 500, CP dramatically decreases while 
all other cost components increases. While as S  further increases, CS, CF, CT and the numbers of 
infrastructures almost remain constant, which implies that little adjustment is made to the optimal design. This is 
because when S  is above a certain value, a customer will always try to visit a facility at any assignment level to 
avoid the high penalty, and the realized penalty cost without the fixed term Ri ii I pOS¦  in the optimization 
objective (8a) shall approach 0. Hence further increasing S  value will not affect the optimal design much. This 
can be verified by observations in Fig. 3(g): the growth of C after 500S !  is almost merely contributed by CP, 
and the growth rate is consistent with the fixed penalty term.  
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 (e) (f) 
 
 (g) (h) 
Fig. 3. Sensitivity analysis 
 
4.2 Case study 
 
    This section conducts a more realistic case study to illustrate how the proposed model can be applied to a real-
world problem. We consider a company that plans to open factories among 49 candidate sites including 
Washington D.C. and 48 continental state capital citiesa, as illustrated by circles in Fig. 4. We assume that the 
yearly prorated investment of building a factory is proportional to the corresponding city population with a scalar 
factor ef. The built factories will supply certain commodity to customers at the same 49 cities, and the number of 
customers in each city is proportional to the corresponding state population with a factor of 10-5. The 
transportation cost per unit commodity between any two cities is proportional to the great circle distance at a cost 
rate of $1 per mile. We assume that in order to operate, each factory has to be connected with at least one of the 
65 nuclear power plants in the U.S.b, as pinpointed by triangles in Fig. 4. We assume that a factory can be only 
connected to a power plant in the same National American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) regionc, and 
all possible supporting relationships from power plants to service factories are shown as arrows that form 
clusters partitioned by the NERC regions. Using a power plant (i.e., connecting at least one factory to this plant) 
incurs a yearly-prorated installation cost proportional to its net power generation with a factor ec. We assume that 
each power plant fails to provide the support p fraction of time over the planning horizon, and the penalty cost 
for a customer to lose the commodity is a constant S . The problem is to identify the best factory location and 
plant selection decision to minimize the expected system cost.  
                                                                
a The U.S. city data are adapted from Daskin (1995). 
b The nuclear power plant data are obtained from the eGRID database at the website http://www.epa.gov/cleanenergy/energy-
resources/egrid/index.html. 
c See http://www.nerc.com/page.php?cid=1%7C9%7C119 for the partition of the NERC regions. 
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Fig. 4. Candidate location network for the case study 
 
    This problem can be formulated into the proposed model (8) by considering commodity factories as service 
facilities and power plants as supporting stations. Again, we set R = 3 in this model. The sensitivity analysis 
results over four parameters are shown in Fig. 5. The bench mark values are 3 30.2, 10 , 1, 10c fp e e S    . 
Despite the heterogeneity in infrastructure costs, the general trends of the curves in Fig. 5(a) and Fig. 5(b) are 
consistent with those in Fig. 3(a) and Fig. 3(b), and the CS and CF vary similarly to the numbers of stations and 
facilities, respectively. As p grows above 0.2, all cost components except CP are relatively stable, and we can 
infer that the optimal design does not vary dramatically. In Fig. 5(c) and Fig. 5(d), CS, CT, CP, and C curves are 
consistent with their counterparts in Fig. 5(c) and Fig. 5(d), while CF looks more stable, and this may be because 
the increased problem size helps smoothen the aggregated results under parameter changes. All curves in Fig. 
5(e) and Fig. 5(h) follow similar trends as their counterparts in Fig. 3(e) and Fig. 3(h).  
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 (c) (d) 
 
 (e) (f) 
 
 (g) (h) 
Fig. 5. Sensitivity analysis for the case study 
 
    Fig. 6 shows the optimal infrastructure deployment under different p  and S  values when we set 
0.002, 0.2c fe e  . The installed plants are denoted by solid triangles while the built factories are denoted by 
solid circles. We see that in all these results, most infrastructures are distributed in the eastern and western areas 
which have relatively high populations. In Fig. 6(a), when the supporting plants are perfectly reliable, we see that 
no more than one plant is built in every region and all built service facilities in this region are connected to it. 
Fig. 6(b) considers a station disruption probability of 0.2, and we see that several more stations are now added to 
provide redundancy. As the station disruption probability continues to increase to 0.4 in Fig. 6(c), it is interesting 
to see that entire cluster of infrastructures in Midwest (NERC region MPO) have been removed, although more 
investment has been used to further enhance the redundancy of supporting plants in other regions. This suggests 
that in an infrastructure system with clustered supporting structures, when disruption risks are present, resources 
shall be concentrated on important clusters to retain their reliability. Also note that the total number of facilities 
has dropped, probably to balance the increase of other cost components. Fig. 6(d) illustrates the case where 
penalty cost S  is decreased by half, and we see that the optimal design will cut infrastructures in relatively 
remote areas with low populations. Since the service is no longer valued as much and the customers are no 
longer willing to travel as long a distance, these infrastructures cannot receive enough demand or create enough 
benefit to justify their construction investment. 
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 (c) p = 0.4, S  = 1000 (d) p = 0.4, S  = 500 
Fig. 6. Optimal infrastructure design ( 0.002, 0.2c fe e  ) 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
    This paper proposed a supporting station structure to characterize complex service facility failure correlations. 
This supporting structure is composed of a set of fallible supporting stations that provide necessary supply to 
service facility operations. We quantified the cost components of the supporting structure and analyzed its key 
properties with regard to modeling spatial heterogeneity and correlations of service facility failures. We found 
that even if the stations are subject to only independent disruptions with identical probabilities, this structure can 
emulate the operations of many real-world systems with interdependent infrastructures and complex interactions. 
Built on this supporting structure, a new reliable facility location model was created for the infrastructure 
location design under heterogeneous and correlated facility failure risks. Case studies showed that the model can 
efficiently solve hypothetical and real-world problems of different sizes. A set of interesting managerial insights 
have been drawn on how key parameters affect the optimal system design and the corresponding cost 
components.  
    This research not only paves a foundation for modeling correlated infrastructure failures but also opens up a 
number of research opportunities on infrastructure design for systems with interdependent elements. It will be 
very interesting to investigate how to use a supporting structure to represent or approximate more general facility 
failure patterns (e.g., negatively correlated failures). In particular, it will be worth studying the trade-off between 
the supporting structure size (e.g., in terms of the number of supporting stations and that of supporting 
connections) and the approximation accuracy and how to construct the most succinct structure at different 
approximation fidelity levels. Due to limited data availability, the numerical examples in this study built upon 
artificial facility correlation patterns. It will be appealing if further empirical studies could be conducted to 
characterize real-world patterns of network facility failures and infrastructure component inter-connections. This 
paper focuses on highlighting the concept of supporting structures, and hence the proposed location design 
model considers a relatively simple system setting. In the future, more detailed components, such as limited 
supporting capacity, limited investment budget, inventory operations and transportation routing, shall be 
incorporated in the framework. As the problem complexity increases, it is necessary to explore customized 
solution algorithms (e.g., Lagrangian relaxation, Bender's decomposition, column generation) to find more 
efficient and accurate solution approaches. This paper assumes that customers have complete information about 
the facility operational status, but in some cases (particularly during an emergency), this may not be the case and 
stochastic customer choice behavior with incomplete information should be investigated in future studies. It is 
also worth investigating how to extend the proposed model to other related problems to enhance the system 
reliability and resilience throughout its life time. 
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